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Phatic Violence? Gambling and the Arts
of Distraction in Laos
“Tempted,” as he put it, by the “demon of terminological invention,” Malinowski first coined
the term “phatic” as one half of a two-word compound, “phatic communion.” Since
Malinowski, “phatic” has often been used to imply a semiotic equation where mere
communicative contact automatically produces positive social relations among those
communicating. This article explores a genre of “trash talk” on the petanque gambling
courts of Luang Prabang, Laos to challenge this assumption and clarify multiple senses of
“phaticity.”With close attention to talk used not for positive communion but for distraction, I
argue that communicative contact as a technical phenomenon must be separated from
communicative contact as a sign of other kinds of meaning. [Phatic, Laos, Interaction,
Gambling]
“Since Thursday I have been in a state of utter distraction. I must absolutely stop this. It is caused by
too violent and too passionate contact with people, by an unnecessary communion of souls.”
–Bronislaw Malinowski (1967:264), A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term
On the male-dominated petanque courts of Luang Prabang, Laos, “saj jaa” ispervasive.1 Saj jaa literally means “to apply medicine” or “to dose,” and,like a dose of medicine, saj jaa affects players’ bodies and emotions,
causing them to lose focus and play poorly. Similar to “trash talk” on a basketball
court or “sledging” on a cricket field, “doses” are talk meant to distract. Doses during
petanque (a French game played like bocce and lawn bowling) can take many forms: a
repeated offer to bet, a call to “smile” for the anthropologist’s camera, or a scream,
right in an opponent’s face, just as he is about to release his petanque ball. Upon
receipt, doses spur both laughter and anger, and transform petanque from a contest of
mere physical prowess into a game of hearts, minds, and words.
Why do these men spend so much time talking, laughing, and fretting about
dosing? What is at stake in their discussions about distraction? Below, I draw on
interviews, filmed games of petanque, and audio-recorded transcription sessions to
show that “dosing” concerns, among other things, the meaning of communicative
contact and the limits of semiotic autonomy during games with money on the line.
While players in these games try to avoid talk, dosers try to foster it. In acts of dosing,
dosers instrumentalize communicative contact. They prey on their victims’ propen-
sity to attend to what is addressed to them and exploit what we might call the
grappling hooks of communication—loud noises, directed gaze, sensorially engaging
movements, questions, and other canonical “first pair parts”—to ensure involvement.
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On first look, nothing about dosing may seem especially surprising. Relatively
antagonistic distractions in sports are familiar (e.g., Quealy and Wolfers 2015), as are
“cat-calls,” DDoS attacks, Internet “trolls,” and other forms of contact that violate
rather than build “positive” social relations. Yet, while such examples are recogniz-
able and commonplace, anthropologists, sociolinguists, and those studying commu-
nication nevertheless often assume communicative contact is inherently good, as if it
could in and of itself create positive bonds among communicants. This assumption is
clear in how scholars discuss the notion of “phaticity.” Although phaticity has
recently become a productive topic for reflection (e.g., Elyachar 2010; Lemon 2013;
Nozawa 2013; Slotta 2015), the term itself contains and invites the conflation of two
distinct senses: a “communion” sense and a “contact” sense. To avoid confusion we
should excise phaticity’s communion sense. Only after we analytically separate
communicative contact as a technical phenomenon (“contact phaticity”) from
communicative contact as a sign of other kinds of meaning and pragmatic function
can we understand the variety of ways actors make contact meaningful.
In the second half of this paper, I return to the petanque court. I show that in doses
and discussions about dosing, people talk about, and at times respond to,
communicative contact as a sign not of communion, but distraction. In these
discussions, the court is imagined as a space of relative communicative paranoia
where almost any contact might be suspect and where dosers try to entice players
into listening against their will. Dosers do not engage in “phatic communion”—i.e.,
communion achieved through mere communicative contact—but, instead, they wield
and deploy what we might call, a bit hyperbolically and with an aim toward contrast,
phatic violence. While players are at times tempted to respond to this “violence” with
argument, anger, and outrage, they prove themselves and the quality of their
characters insofar as they can ignore it, keep “cool,” and maintain semiotic autonomy
in the face of distraction.
Contact Tropes and the Two Phaticities
Malinowski, “tempted,” as he put it, by the “demon of terminological invention,”
first coined “phatic” as one half of a two-word compound, “phatic communion.”2
“Phatic communion,” he wrote, captured “a new type of linguistic use,” “a type of
speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words” (Ogden et al.
1946:315). Silence, Malinowski argued, is “alarming and dangerous” but “[t]he
breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of
fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion
of food” (Ogden et al. 1946:314; see also Hayakawa 1941:80).
Malinowski’s first descriptions of phatic communion imply a semiotic equa-
tion in which mere chatter, mere linguistic contact, produces positive rapport.3 I
argue that this equation is neither automatic nor pre-semiotic but a contact trope,
an “ethno”-assumption where the fact of communicative contact (or its absence) is
itself thematized, reflected on, and—at what we might think of as a higher “order
of indexicality” (Silverstein 2003)—made into a sign of something else. Contact
tropes are condensations of semiotic ideologies, and when one starts looking for
them, one finds them almost everywhere. In a bar, for instance, when patrons
mention a bartender’s communicative “availability”—the ease with which a patron
can attract her attention—as a sign of good service: “She’s very attentive.” Or in
the New York City subway, where eye contact is alternately a way to find a
date and, “if it’s a ‘crazy’ New Yorker. . .an invitation to their crazy” (Buckley
2015).
Contact tropes abound. But the trope Malinowski identified and adopted with the
notion of “phatic communion”—that contact creates positive fellowship—seems
especially entrenched both in common parlance (e.g., “We text all the time” or “She
never calls”) and in academic discussion. For example, consider Durkheim’s (1915)
notion of “collective effervescence”—a moral force outside ourselves, the result of
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mere interaction—or consider Sapir (1949:16), who wrote of an “important sense in
which language is a socializer beyond its literal use as a means of communication.”
“This,” Sapir continued, “is in the establishment of rapport between the members of a
physical group, such as a house party. It is not what is said that matters so much as
that something is said…. This caressing or reassuring quality of speech in general,
even where no one has anything of moment to communicate, reminds us how much
more language is than a mere technique of communication.”4
At first blush, greetings have seemed especially compelling proof of the
inseparability of contact from communion. Greetings seem to combine the moment
of contact with pleasant, “communion producing” turns of phrase, “easing” the
transition into and out of interaction (see Laver 1975:236). But even greetings provide
flawed evidence. As Duranti (1992:668; 1997) notes, a formal greeting need not
overlap with the moment of establishing communicative contact (that is, a greeting is
not always a “summons” nor an “answer” (Schegloff 1968)). But more importantly,
not all greetings, broadly understood, build a “good” relationship: think of an
aggressive “Hello!” on a sidewalk or a shouted “Hey baby!” from a moving car.
These utterances are more likely to leave one frazzled and shaken-up than
communed.
Such counter-examples of contact without communion appear obvious when
mentioned. Much like we know that disputes, arguments, and physical violence
exist and are linguistically mediated (e.g., Brenneis 1988; Pagliai 2010), so too do we
easily recognize that communicative contact is often aggressive, unwanted, or
unremarkable. Nevertheless, the assumption that contact creates communion
continues. To parallel Irvine’s (1996:123) commentary on popular assumptions
about language and community, just as it has often seemed “‘natural’ to suppose
that [a shared] language itself creates community,” so too has it often seemed
“natural” that merely being “in touch” or “in contact” creates positive bonds among
communicants.
For linguistic anthropologists, the assumption is buried in our chief analytic for
studying contact: phaticity.5 Phaticity has two prominent and distinct senses. On the
one hand, phaticity is used in a communion sense, where it refers to semantically
“empty” talk that builds positive social relations, such as casual talk about the
weather. On the other hand, phaticity is used in a contact sense, where it refers to
communication that is itself about or oriented toward communicative contact, such
as, “John!”, said as a summons. While the communion sense is concerned with
producing “positive” interactional effects through language, the contact sense is a
technical category meant to describe an orientation to contact generally, no matter the
(dis)affiliative effects of contact. When phaticity’s two distinct senses are conflated,
when the term is used in both its senses at the same time, it carries forward the
assumption that contact creates communion.
The “communion sense” of phaticity has not received much sustained attention by
linguistic anthropologists. Yet, across fields, use of the “communion sense” is more
pervasive than use of the “contact sense,” especially among sociolinguists and those
studying pragmatics. This sense can also be found in related disciplines (e.g.,
communication studies: Wang, Tucker, and Rihll 2011; Wang, Tucker, and Haines
2012), in popular, educated discourse, and even in my computer’s built-in dictionary.
Since Malinowski’s invention of “phatic communion,” the communion sense of
phaticity has been relatively stable, continuing to refer to language with (1) a
“nonreferential character” and (2) an “emphasis on social ties” (Meltzer and Musolf
2003:143). Those studying this sense recently and in depth (e.g., Coupland 2014;
Coupland, Coupland, and Robinson 1992; Laver 1975; Meltzer and Musolf 2003;
Schneider 1988; Senft 1995; Trudgill 2003:102–103) however, tend not to care much
about the notion of “communicative contact.” Instead, these scholars seem most
interested in a question long at the core of every variety of “socio”-linguistics
broadly understood: to what extent is talk socially oriented? Simply put, an
argument for communion phaticity is an argument that semantico-referential
296 Journal of Linguistic Anthropology
meaning is not the only “meaning” at stake (e.g., Silverstein 1976). This is a battle
Malinowski waged on other fronts as well (Ogden et al. 1946; Malinowski 1965; for
Malinowski’s approach to language generally, see Firth 1957; Young 2012), and one
that linguistic anthropologists wage frequently, albeit with terms other than
“phaticity.”6
In contrast to the communion sense of phaticity and its focus on positive social
affiliation, the contact sense of phaticity captures communication that is oriented to
the preconditions of communicative contact. Jakobson, who borrowed the term
“phatic” from Malinowski,7 was the first to develop the notion. He introduced the
“phatic function” as one of six functions of language. He defined it as an orientation
to “contact,” or the “physical channel and psychological connection between the
addresser and the addressee, [that enables] both of them to enter and stay in
communication” (1960:353).
In his enormous oeuvre, Jakobson (1960:355–356) touches on the phatic function
only briefly:
There are messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue commu-
nication, to check whether the channel works (“Hello, do you hear me?”), to attract the
attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention (“Are you listening?” or in
Shakespearean diction, “Lend me your ears!”—and on the other end of the wire “Um-
hum!”). This set for CONTACT, or in Malinowski’s terms PHATIC function, may be
displayed by a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas, by entire dialogues with the mere
purport of prolonging communication. Dorothy Parker caught eloquent examples: “‘Well!’
the young man said. ‘Well!’ she said. ‘Well, here we are,’ he said. ‘Here we are,’ she said,
‘Aren’t we?’ ‘I should say we were,’ he said, ‘Eeyop! Here we are,’ she said, ‘Aren’t we?’ ‘I
should say we were,’ he said, ‘Eeyop! Here we are.’ ‘Well!’ she said. ‘Well!’ he said, ‘well.’”
The endeavor to start and sustain communication is typical of talking birds; thus the phatic
function of language is the only one they share with human beings. It is also the first verbal
function acquired by infants; they are prone to communicate before being able to send or
receive informative communication.
In this passage, Jakobson seems to have a primarily technical view of the
communication problem in mind, like that evident in the work of Claude Shannon
(see Geoghegan (2011) and Jakobson (1961) for Jakobson’s view of “Information
Theory”). Like Shannon’s (1998:31) theory of communication, Jakobson appears
mostly concerned with the “engineering problem” of language, although he mentions
some tropic uses of contact in his definition.
But what exactly this “engineering problem” entails is not especially clear, nor
has it been the subject of much exegesis. One starting point is Clark’s (1996:152)
discussion of a number of “levels” in communicative acts.8 The lowest and most
basic of these levels concerns the management of contact. Clark calls this level the
level of “execution and attention” and it involves the executing of a sign for
someone (i.e., addressivity or “targeting” (Bales et al. 1951:462)) and the attending
to a sign from someone (i.e., attention). Think of leaning in so a friend can hear
you in a crowded bar or staring at your computer to hint at a chatty study mate
to quiet down; “engineering” signs like these affect—that is, enable or impede—
communicative contact and presuppose what that contact might require. When
one starts exploring these signs closely, it becomes clear that the notion of “contact
phaticity” still bundles together multiple elements worth distinguishing: pro-
contact versus isolationist signs; the different semiotic modalities and technologies
people use to act on contact; gradient degrees of contact; and the extent to which
contact is symmetrically or asymmetrically oriented to by participants, for
example.9
While still inchoate, a technical view of phaticity like this is helpful because it
emphasizes that contact’s pragmatic effects are underspecified. Focusing on execu-
tion and attention also helps avoid the notion of “channel” in favor of “contact.”
Channels bring to mind relatively permanent and discrete things, as if, once
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established, they sit like a tunnel from the UK to France. But “communicative
channels” are not always already “there.”10 Instead, they are often produced and
maintained through constant semiotic (i.e., not strictly “linguistic”11) work: “back-
channel” cues (Saft 2007), shifts in gaze (Goodwin 1981), adjustments in bodily
orientation (Schegloff 1998), and so on.12 As Sidnell (2009:132) puts it, once we take
note of the abundance of “non-linguistic” forms, we see “that contact is a pervasive
concern and a contingent accomplishment which is achieved moment-by-moment in
the details of interaction.”
No matter how exactly we delimit what contact is, it is clear that questions of
contact are analytically distinct from the communion sense of phaticity. While the
communion sense captures language aimed at fostering positive sociality, contact
phaticity captures language aimed at acting on, or commenting upon, the precon-
ditions of communication. And yet, even in linguistic anthropology where the
communion sense is not subject to much discussion (and perhaps because it is not
subject to much discussion), communion phaticity haunts our notion of contact. The
two senses are often combined, and the communion sense is assumed to go along
with, or emerge from, contact. In Ahearn’s (2011:19–20) recent summary of
Jakobson’s functions, for example, she writes that the phatic function is prominent
in both a sound test, where the focus is “mainly on the physical channel or mode of
contact (a microphone)….” and, “[w]hen the channel is a more abstractly conceived
social connection rather than a physical one – a relationship of friendship or kinship,
for example….” Kunreuther (2010:340) similarly argues that when FM radio callers
“pepper their conversations with radio hosts with questions like ‘do you hear me?’ or
‘did you get my letter?’ or the common Nepali greeting ‘Have you eaten rice?’,” they
draw “. . .attention to the voice and the radio as mediating tools of social relations.”
While both Ahearn and Kunreuther would surely agree that mere contact does not
produce communion, the term phaticity—with its dual senses—smuggles the
opposite assumption forward.
Over the last few years, as interest in “phaticity” has increased, multiple
anthropologists have identified contact tropes like Malinowski’s “phatic commu-
nion” in their fieldsites. Slotta (2015), for example, analyzes truth and reconciliation
hearings in Canada as “phatic rituals,” which “aim to establish a form of
communicative contact—a kind of phatic communion—among citizens and agents
of the state that realizes liberal and democratic ideals of communication” (2015:131;
internal citation removed). He shows that support for truth and reconciliation
hearings is based on a contact trope qua Habermasian ideal: an “open,” “equal,” and
“free” state of communicative contact (2015:135) where contact will automatically
yield positive political consequences. Nozawa describes how Japanese organizations
mobilize varieties of contact to counteract kodokushi or “solitary death,” especially
among the elderly (2015:283–284). For example, one group organizes a service called
Fureai Yubin, or “touching together postal services”, hand-delivering letters to the
elderly and telling the recipients “Hello, you’ve got mail.” For this group, the goal is
contact itself, as contact is represented as a means for fostering positive sociality, “a
society of touching-together” (fureai shakai). Finally, Elyachar (2010) argues that
Cairene women use “phatic labor” to create an infrastructure of “communicative
channels.” She contends these women spend time visiting others often for no purpose
other than “just being sociable” and that anthropologists should attend to this phatic
labor, even when it is not ostensibly economic.
Elyachar’s argument, in particular, is worth unpacking. While she argues
persuasively for the importance of neglected modalities of sociality, she at times
treats social relations as automatically following from, or consisting of, “commu-
nicative channels.” Surely there is much more to the social relations she describes
than just regular contact or keeping the channel “open.” Perhaps people in Cairo tend
to grade or consider social relations in terms of the frequency or length of social
visits? Or perhaps, like Elyachar herself does in the article, they discuss the quality of
“knowing” other people as if it were a “communicative channel”? While contact
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might be a precondition for some social relations to exist, it is not the substance or a
necessary and sufficient feature of these relations—even if it is imagined as such. The
details and ethnographic specificities of contact matter, they are the infrastructure
that makes contact meaningful, and these same details are liable to be forgotten or
ignored when academics borrow the notion of “phatic communion” and apply it to
new social and semiotic contexts.
Lemon (2013:69) argues that not all “communicative gaps” are the same, that there
is “no single, universal experience of ‘downed wires’ or ‘tuning in’ to radio static. . .”
Rather, and following Keane (2014:11), the technical dimensions of such commu-
nicative gaps, and communicative contact generally, are affordances for social and
ethical meaning. It is an oft-repeated truism in linguistic anthropology that the poetic
function need not be limited to “poetry,” or confined to a single pragmatic effect. To
make “phaticity” more useful, we should be equally adamant that positive
communion is not embedded “inside” contact (see Fleming and Lempert 2014 for
recent discussion of poetic performativity), even if it is often interpreted and talked
about as such in our fieldsites. Contact qua affordance motivates rather than
determines contact tropes and construals of communication in interaction.
To make this point starkly, I now introduce phatic communion’s foil, phatic violence.
Contact Is Distraction
Tom, a man in his mid-forties whose in-laws own a petanque court in Luang Prabang,
had just come back from a month-long trip to Laos’s capital, Vientiane. In the capital,
he had gone to a funeral, briefly ordained as a novice monk, and, when unoccupied,
driven from one petanque court to another, gambling for money with other men.
When he returned, a few of us drank beer at his in-laws’ court, and he told us what it
was like to gamble in the capital. People play for much more money than in Luang
Prabang, he told us, and they play “politely” (suphaap4). They are not loud, and they
never dose.
Everyone listening at the court seemed unsurprised. Like his listing of the large
amounts of money for which the men in Vientiane played, his mentioning of the
frequency with which the gamblers changed courts to balance matches, and his
stressing that even some of the best players in Luang Prabang would not have the
“heart” to play in Vientiane, his observations seemed to confirm people’s assump-
tions about how big time gambling games work and feel. When money is on the line,
too much talk—and especially anything resembling a dose—is liable to lead to
argument, and thus best avoided. In these games where dosing (and the search for
any advantage generally) is most desirable for the doser and vigilantly anticipated by
his victim, dosing is also most sanctioned. As one man told me in an interview, most
players in big money games, fearing violence and anger, “do not even dare open their
mouths.”
Ideologies around “talk” and “dosing” during money gambling games provide a
stark contrast to assumptions that contact creates communion. While games in Luang
Prabang are rarely silent, and serious violence is rare, communicative contact on the
court is sometimes fraught with tension and conflict. In this section, I trace the
economic inflection of dosing as an ethno-metapragmatic category, the tendency to
frame doses as “just talk,” and the disjuncture between typical doses on the court, on
the one hand, and prototypical doses, on the other. While the former typical doses
use contact as scaffolding for distraction, the latter doses distract through contact,
signals that grab attention, and anchor the contact trope at the heart of dosing: contact
is distraction.
Over the past 15 years, petanque has become extremely popular in Laos. The French
form of boules (like bocce, bowls, and lawn bowling), first invented in the early 1900s,
can now be seen in almost every nook and cranny of Luang Prabang, the city where I
conducted the majority of my fieldwork. Petanque in Luang Prabang typically
involves gambling in one of two ways: either for beer or for money. People tend to
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talk about the two kinds of gambling in maximally contrastive ways, claiming that
beer-gambling builds solidarity, friendship, and love among the players, and that
money-gambling is likely to cause arguments and social discord. These two styles of
play are ideal typical categories, and their relationship to actual economic practice, to
the contexts in which they are most mentioned, and to types of characterological
figures, go beyond the scope of this article. But suffice it to note that while people do
frequently distract one another and sometimes accuse one another of dosing in beer-
gambling games, dosing is closely associated with games where pure cash is on the
line, even though it is most sanctioned within these games. Dosing has connotations
of greedy and antagonistic interest in both winning the game and winning money.
Money gambling games in Luang Prabang are thus, by assumption, more serious
games than beer-gambling games, where a dose is both less tolerated and expected,
and where the play-frame and the “fun” (muan1) of the event is liable to break (cf.
Bateson 1972:182). The examples of dosing below are taken from two money-
gambling games played on two different courts in the city. Both games had audiences
of over a dozen, some of whom were betting.13 For reasons again too elaborate to
explore here (e.g., the gendered nature of economic risk and the public-ness of
petanque), these more serious money gambling games are almost exclusively played
by adult men.
Partly because of dosing’s association with greed, dosing is something with which
players try not to be publicly associated. Alleged dosers invariably insist they are
“merely talking” or “just joking” (e.g., vaw4 laa5 laa5; vaw4 suu1 suu1; vaw4 liin5; vaw4
jook5).14 Sometimes in interviews and casual conversations, when I asked people to
tell me about dosing, they claimed they knew nothing about it and laughingly
pointed me to others: “You want to know about dosing,” one man said during an
interview at the court, “ask Bii over there! He has seven techniques!” In contrast to
acts like agreeing to play a game in the first place or ordering an M150 energy drink
from a drink seller at the court, doses are rarely “on record.” Rather, they tend to
function as “indirect performatives” (Lempert 2012), plausibly deniable and publicly
suspended between being “just talk” (kaanvaw4) and “distraction” (kaanlopkuan3
samaathiq1). A claim on the court that a dose is a dose is thus not merely descriptive
but also, political, and usually responded to with a denial.
Take, for example, Can’s response to an accusation of dosing during a filmed
money gambling game (Figure 1, below). In the game, a man named Bii and I are
playing as teammates against PhomPhui. We are playing for about twenty dollars
and have an audience of around a dozen, including Can. Can is a small-in-stature,
large-in-personality boat captain in his mid-forties who often gambled away the slow
days when he did not have customers. Can bet twenty thousand Kiip, (about two
dollars and fifty cents; a small bet for the court), that Bii and I would lose. Shortly
after Can made his bet, and just as Bii readied to take a shot, Can called out, khaam5
hua3 or, “[you’ll] overthrow [the ball],” a common dose. Bii, apparently unfazed,
successfully made his shot.
This sequence highlights many of the regular features of dosing and its
interpretation: Can (presumably) aims to influence the game by telling Bii he will
“overthrow the ball” (line 1); Can denies he is dosing (line 7); and finally, another
spectator explicitly ties Can’s dosing to the fact that he is gambling on the game
(line 8), which he also denies (line 10).
What is phatic about Can’s dose? “You’ll overthrow the ball”—like all talk—
requires a threshold of contact to work, that is, it has to be both perceptible and
perceived. But contact phaticity is not its most foregrounded function. Can aims to
ensure that the dose is perceived by addressing it to Bii and as Can talks, he directly
faces Bii. But once he delivers this line, he then turns away from Bii to watch Bii’s ball
hit its target. Can does not turn back toward Bii until more than five seconds later,
when Bii accuses him of dosing. But while “You’ll overthrow the ball” requires
minimal contact to work, the common dose is designed to distract not merely
through this contact, but through its content. One player explained how the phrase
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should function: “if you tell someone he is going to overthrow [the ball],” he said,
“[he might overthrow it], but he also might underthrow [it].” In other words, saying
“you’ll overthrow the ball” leads the addressee to make adjustments, attend to his
throwing form, and to at least overthink his shot, even if he doesn’t overthrow it.
In contrast to “You’ll overthrow the ball,” take Can’s scream, occurring later in the
same game. As Bii wound up to take a shot, Can, who was standing near him and
previously silent, raised his hands and yelled. All three people with whom I tried to
transcribe the scream gave different accounts of what Can actually said, but each of
them stressed that the content of what he said did not matter.15 Bii missed his shot.
After the scream, Can scampered back to his seat and Bii told me to hit him “on the
lips” with the petanque ball I was holding. “Hit Bii on the lips,” Can called back. “He
is the one talking.” “On the lips” (sop2), they both said, as if to target their respective
weapons of phatic violence.
Unlike “You’ll overthrow the ball,” Can’s scream used almost pure communica-
tive contact to achieve his ends. Apparently, it succeeded. The scream worked
through surprise, and, as one spectator put it immediately after it happened, the
scream’s effect was irresistible: “[Of course Bii] was surprised,” the spectator said,
“[Can] shouted so loud, [who wouldn’t] be?”16 The scream was taken as a sign
capable of forcing its interpretant—a sort of automatic phatic, the aural equivalent of
what Virilio (1994:14) refers to as a “phatic image,” a “targeted image that forces you
to look and holds your attention.”
While most doses do not distract like this, doses like the scream—with their
timing, speed, volume, relative non-referentiality, and direct addressivity—seem to
ideologically anchor what dosing “really” is. These doses are aimed almost entirely at
initiating contact (of an immediate and brief variety) and engaging attention, and, in
Figure 1. You’ll overthrow the ball.
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doing so they bolster the contact trope at the heart of dosing, where talk, not just
screams, is shorthand for distraction.
Can’s scream was not the typical dose one sees during money gambling games but
it was prototypical. When I showed the video of Can’s scream to Muu—a petanque
player, friend, and occasional research assistant—during a transcription session, he
drew a strong line between such prototypical doses and normal doses. I paired the
video of the scream with a video of a less forceful (possible) dose that Bii had made
during the same game. In Bii’s dose he had said, with characteristic acerbic wit, that
his opponent PhomPhui was so overweight that his paunch prevented him from
throwing the petanque ball correctly. After the dose, PhomPhui, having just taken a
shot in the game, briefly glanced at Bii as Bii talked about his belly and then quietly
turned around to face the empty back-end of the court.
Sitting in front of a monitor in my room in Luang Prabang set up for the purpose, I
asked Muu about Bii’s comment: “Was he dosing?” Muu said that while one could
argue that Bii was dosing, he would probably say Bii was merely “joking” (jook5) or
maybe “bothering” (kuan3). In other words, he was not obviously dosing, nor, Muu
told me, was he saying anything worth being upset over (boø-pen3-taa3 khiat5). I then
played Can’s scream for Muu and he enthusiastically told me that it was “real
dosing”: “Yeah, this, this is real dosing,” he said, “this one [is dosing].”17 Muu
continued: whereas in Bii’s joke one would need to ask Bii whether he was trying to
dose to know for sure, in the case of Can’s scream, it was “clear that [Can] was
intending to dose.”18 It was worth being upset over.
As Muu and a number of other players with whom I spoke put it, Can’s scream
was a paradigmatic forceful dose, a paragon of “real dosing” or what people
sometimes call saj1 jaa3 puk2, or, “harsh, powerful dosing.” The scream was in fact so
powerful, so puk2, that Bii treated it as crossing the line between fair and foul play.
After telling me to hit Can in the lips, Bii yelled at Can for screaming, for being an
idiot, for not having the sense to see that this was a game with money riding on it.
“Just talking is fine, but you can’t go ‘hoo’ like that,” Bii said, using the sound-
symbolic “hoo” to mimic Can’s more or less referentially empty scream, thereby
drawing a line between “noise” and “talk.”
The dispute between Can and Bii continued through a few more turns in the game
following the scream. After much back and forth, Can framed Bii’s sensitivity to talk
as extreme: if Bii wanted him to be quiet, he would be completely quiet. This implied
Figure 1a. Can’s Scream
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Bii was incapable of handling any talk or noise generally, not just screams. Rather
than present himself as such a person, Bii invited Can not to shush up, but to do the
opposite. After hitting his next shot Bii called out to Can, “You want to talk, you can
talk all day!”19
Bii’s reaction highlights another dimension of dosing on the petanque court: staying
“cool” in the face of talk is both valuable and valued. Resisting other’s attempts to
involve you communicatively is an instrument of winning money and respect, and an
index and affirmation of the kind of person you are: here, a strong, autonomous man,
inured to the pressure of others. When Can and other dosers claim they are “just
talking,” they are not only maintaining plausible deniability and anticipating
accusations of greed, but challenging their potential victims to accept these doses as
“just talk,” to treat them as harmless, and thus prove that they are the kinds of people
that can handle such talk.
Dosing is said to be partially conquerable through the development of an
internally focused, masculine, and autonomous disposition that remains calm under
both phatic and economic pressure. As one player bragged about himself, “No,
[I never respond to hecklers]. [When I play], I’m not interested [in dosing]. That’s me.
I pay attention to [the shots I take] and that’s it. I’m not interested in anything [else].”
Much like I was told at the Buddhist temple down the road from the money-
gambling court that a monk who meditates can learn to not be bothered, or even
bitten, by mosquitoes if he meditates properly, petanque players told me that they
could become inured to the siren song of saj jaa.
Players tend to discuss this inurement in terms of the management of emotional
states, often drawing analogies between experienced players and experienced
fighting cocks (cf. Geertz 1973). Those most vulnerable to dosing are said to be
“weak-hearted” (caj3 qoon1). Like “spring chickens” (kaj3 qoon1) with “soft, porous
skin” (nang3 puaj1), they “tremble” (san1 kathuan2) in response to dosing, and feel
“angry” (caj3 haaj4) and “rushed” (caj3 hoon4, literally, “hot hearted”). Those who can
resist dosing are tough and inured like “experienced fighting cocks” (kaj1 kêê1) with
“tight, rubbery skin” (nang1 niaw3). Their hearts are stronger and more capable (caj3
khaw2 daj4). They stay “cool and calm” (caj3 jen3, literally, “cool hearted”) under
“pressure” (khwaam2 kot2 dan3), and thus can play their best.20
A capable and brave heart allows one to treat dosing as just frivolous talk and to
ignore it accordingly. The contact trope here is that contact is distraction, and the
often-stated ideal is not to stop everyone else from talking, but to adopt a policy of
ostensive phatic isolationism. Of course, in practice, players do communicate with
others as they play. Not only do they perceive and at times directly respond to dosers
as, for example, Bii responded to Can above, but they also often talk with and non-
verbally signal to their opponents concerning issues required to facilitate the game:
events happening around the court, bets to be made, and so on. In a basic way,
playing the game requires communication. For instance, players must keep and
communicate the score (often with scoreboards) and mark off the spot they and their
opponents will throw from (with foot-drawn semi-circles on the gravel court).
And yet, while contact is unavoidable, the contact trope that one should not
“attend to” or “be interested in” one’s opponents continues. Tellingly, some of the
most common forms of response to doses still explicitly deny a degree of
communicative contact, even as they presuppose it. By far the most idiomatic
response to dosing is to yell vaw4 nam2 phaj3—meaning, “who are you talking to?”—
to the doser. Players often shout this as their petanque balls fly through the air, a
challenge to whoever was talking. This phrase simultaneously denies the effective
addressivity of a dose, as it also evokes the sense of a mismatch between the doser’s
intent and the strong, “cool-ness” of his target. Think here of Robert De Niro’s
character in Taxi Driver who follows his famous line, Are “you talking to me?” with,
“Who the fuck do you think you’re talking to?”
When players themselves become dosers, they are said to risk over-involvement.
Talking, not just listening, can be dangerous for one’s focus. This is what one
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audience member said happened, for instance, during the game I discuss in examples
below: a player named Phuumii “tried to dose [his opponents], and ended up
startling himself.” Partly because of this risk of over-involvement, audience members
betting on the game, not players, are said to be the most common dosers. When not
dosing, these audience members also sometimes work to calm players they are
supporting or betting on: “Cool your heart down,” (caj3 jenjen2) “Don’t pay attention
to anyone,” (boø-toong4 son3 caj3 phaj3 leej2 naa1) “Don’t listen to what they say,” (boø-
toong4 fang2 khwaam2 khaw2). Like vaw4 nam2 phaj3, some of these suggestions
involve partial contradictions. When audience members tell players, for instance, to
“not pay attention to anyone!” and then continue to offer further advice, they are
producing messages that will only be received if their addressees are, in fact, paying
attention. These kinds of comments reveal the inevitable chasm between ideologically
dominant contact tropes—like the trope that communication is distraction, best
avoided—and the realities of the cross-modal negotiation of contact phaticity.
The Arts of Distraction
Up to this point, I have discussed ideologies of how dosing qua metapragmatic
category works and the contact trope that informs it. In this section, I explore two
more examples of actual, filmed doses to show some of the ways dosers do in fact try
to secure contact. These examples do not exhaust the methods dosers use to attract
victims, which can vary endlessly from subtle comments, to screaming, to an
audience member I once saw who placed a pebble in a player’s exposed butt-crack.
Rather, the examples show two methods with which one doser—in this case, a player
named Phuumii—exploits the basic phatic resources we have as humans to invite
communicative involvement for relatively antagonistic purposes. In both cases,
Phuumii appears to establish contact as an attempt to distract his opponent and win
the opponent’s money. In both cases he ultimately fails, as his opponent almost
entirely ignores Phuumii and continues to win the game.
The examples are from a money-gambling game that Phuumii played with three
others: his partner, Saj, Taa and Taa’s partner Laa. The first example showcases how
Phuumii uses what conversation analysts call “First Pair Parts” (FPPs), like questions
and offers to bet. These phatic “hooks” and, perhaps more accurately, the features
that compose them (c.f. Stivers and Rossano 2010), invite both their target’s attention
and a verbal response, like an answer to a question.
The players were playing during the late morning at Luang Prabang’s most
popular money-gambling petanque court. Phuumii, a prolific doser in Luang Prabang,
acted frantically for much of the game. He yelled, clapped, and generally displayed a
“hot” sociality that was the subject of much joking among audience members. He
both evinced a distracted state and produced distraction. Taa, in contrast, talked
more quietly for much of the game.
When the transcript below begins, Phuumii has just made a successful shot and
offered to bet Taa additional money. Taa does not treat this offer to bet as genuine,
but rejects it out of hand with, “Hah [literally “semen”] who you are playing with?”
(line 2). He then takes his shot and misses. His miss seems to encourage Phuumii,
who now even more enthusiastically offers to bet him.
I have included this example because of the strong contrast between Phuumii’s
persistent FPPs and Taa’s avoidance of contact. The two actors push toward opposite
phatic possibilities. Such a stark contrast is not unusual on the court. As Phuumii
offers to bet, his body is hyper-animated; he steps forward, envelops the area where
Taa will be throwing his petanque ball and floods Taa with stimuli (a pointed finger,
a circling hand, a shouted “hee4!”). As he addresses Taa and invites him to respond,
Phuumii’s actions are heavy with what we might call pro-contact phaticity.
Everything he does seems to be aimed at getting Taa to attend to and engage
with him, and thus lose focus on the game.21 Taa, in contrast, plays it cool. After
initially rejecting Phuumii’s offers out of hand, he ignores Phuumii; he does not look
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at him, he does not talk to him, but merely bellows out a response cry upon missing
a shot (line 6). His actions are loaded with another kind of contact phaticity, namely,
an apparent studied disattention to Phuumii’s FPPs, along with his offers of
information (as in line 8, where he says: “If you knock this ball, you’ll get five
[points]”) and noisiness, (i.e. the non-referentially meaningful cry hee4 in line 9); such
disattention is both a tool for ignoring Phuumii and a sign that Taa is unaffected
(Zuckerman, Forthcoming).
Offers to bet are said to be potent FPPs. As one player told me during an interview,
these offers encourage a potential victim to think about the money he already has
staked, and to thus feel more pressure. These offers are thought especially effective if
the player entertains the bet, steps back from his shot, and chats for a moment. For
example, Phuumii, a few minutes after the talk in the next example (Figure 3),
paused before throwing and responded to a series of offers to bet (none of which
materialized) from Taa, Laa, and two other audience members. One of the audience
members commented about Phuumii’s apparent openness to such FPPs when he was
about to shoot: “He’s just there looking to apply pressure on himself.”22
There are parallels to the phatic violence of the court in a number of different
contexts. Haviland (2011:258), citing Sacks and Jefferson (1995), calls the adjacency
pair a “basic mechanism of social coercion” and it seems that FPPs are particularly
Figure 2. Dosing with FPPs.
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good ways of getting one’s communicative “foot in the door.” Gardner (1980:342)
shows that street harassers, in a more troubling variety of phatic violence, use these
coercive devices to engage their victims. She provides the following example: “A
young woman walks past a New York stoop where she hears a man say sincerely,
‘Excuse me, miss.’ When she turns to see what he wants, he says, ‘You sure have got
great boobs.’” Like the street harasser, Phuumii uses first pair parts, in this case bet
offers, to grab Taa’s attention and suggest he respond.
FPPs like offers to bet are compelling phatic resources in that they, like summonses
(Schegloff 1968), project further talk. Unlike Can’s scream, or even “You’ll overthrow
it,” they do not open contact (in the form of their victim’s attention) merely to then
close it, but invite relatively sustained involvement from their victims and encourage
a “symmetrical” form of contact, where both actors execute signs for one another and
attend to signs from one another.
In the next example (Figure 3), I show that dosers do not just use FPPs as
mechanisms to draw potential victims into conversation, but that they sometimes
force contact through the use of SPPs (or second pair parts, the expected answers and
responses that people provide to FPPs) designed to intercept their victims’ talk in
what we might label a kind of “SPP-poaching.” In this example, taken from the same
match, Taa twice asks his partner, Laa, questions. Laa responds to Taa’s questions
each time, but so does Phuumii. In responding as well, Phuumii tries to “poach” the
SPP from Laa. When Taa asks his questions, he is deciding whether he should make a
“shooting” shot (in which he would aim to hit a ball off the court) or an “approach”
shot (in which he would aim to throw his ball close to the jack). To do this, he needs
to know how many remaining balls his partner, Laa, has, and how many remaining
balls Phuumii and Phuumii’s partner have.
Taa asks three questions during this segment of the interaction (in lines 1, 5, and 9),
two of which (lines 1 and 9) are clearly addressed to Laa. Both Laa and Phuumii
answer all three of these questions with their own SPPs (as shown in the Adjacency
Relation column of Figure 3; parallelistic forms are in grey).
Below, I present each of the three adjacency-pair-sets in detail to show how
Phuumii intercepts Taa’s FPPs and uses them as a pivot from which to further dose
Taa. First, in line (1), Taa addresses Laa, with the question “Are you out of balls?”23
Laa responds to Taa, matching, as is common, the format of Taa’s question (that is, he
also uses the words mot2 l̂eêw4). Phuumii also responds to—again paralleling, or
“format tying” (Goodwin 1990) Taa’s FPP—but unlike Laa, he includes an additional
(Luang Prabang specific) epistemic sentence final particle (qoo4) that means
something like “of course” or “alright” in sentence final position in English. In fact,
Phuumii uses similar epistemic sentence final particles in each of his three attempts to
SPP-poach, and it is plausible that such epistemic markers help further insert
Phuumii into the interaction and set his hooks, as it were. “Recipient tilted epistemic
asymmetry,” as Stivers and Rossano (2010) put it, has been argued to be one of the
features that encourages a response from an interlocutor, and such asymmetry is the
core of what a question is. Perhaps the particle qoo4 here not only signals a “tilted
epistemic asymmetry,” but marks Phuumii’s response as a particularly—on the face
of it—informative, and thus engaging, SPP.
Phuumii—with one foot already in the communicative door, as it were—then
follows this SPP with a dose (also an FPP) in lines (4) and (6). The second dose (6) is
an expansion on the first (4) and they form together a popular kind of dose that I call
a “bravery” gambit. In saying, “Are you brave enough to shoot?” Phuumii
presupposes some common assumptions about “shooting” shots: they are higher
risk and higher reward, and they take a strong, brave, and masculine heart to pull off.
The idea behind the bravery gambit is to challenge your opponent’s “heart,” to force
him into a poor decision, but also more generally, to make him overthink whether he
is skilled enough or has the mettle to take a shot.
But Taa ostensibly ignores Phuumii’s FPPs about bravery, and (in line 5) asks how
many balls Phuumii has, information he needs in order to decide whether he should
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“shoot” or “point” on his upcoming turn. Unlike Taa’s first FPP (i.e., FPP(A)) the
addressivity of this utterance seems more diffuse, at least in the moment it is said; Taa
looks at Phuumii as he says it, but it is unclear whether this looking is a sign of
addressivity, or a gathering of information about his subject matter (i.e., Phuumii).
The form qaaj4 or “older brother” that Taa uses to refer to Phuumii does not tell us
much either, as it can be used both as an address term or a third person referent,
depending on the context. In response, Phuumii provides Taa with another format
tied SPP (line 7), and another attempt at poaching. Here again, he uses an epistemic
particle, this time thêê4, which often means “true” but which in this context I have
translated, like qoo1, as “alright!” Laa, in turn, overlapping in speech with Phuumii
(as marked with an initial bracket in the transcript), provides Taa with a more specific
SPP (line 8), again format tying his SPP with Taa’s FPP. Taa presented with two
simultaneous SPPs, one from Laa and one from Phuumi, ignores Phuumii and asks
Laa a follow-up question.
SPP-poaching like this highlights a tension at the heart of dosing and gambling,
mentioned above. No matter how dangerous to your concentration attending to or
Figure 3. SPP-poaching.
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talking to an opponent might be, when you play petanque, contact is a necessary part
of the game—teams need to be made, turns need to be coordinated, and points need
to be counted. Taa’s diffusedly addressed question (line 5) seems a partial
acknowledgment of this tension: although Phuumii would be more likely to know
the answer to the question, as soon as it is clear that Laa, Taa’s partner, knows the
answer, Taa engages with Laa and not with Phuumii.
Taa’s next FPP (line 9; FPP(E)) is also responded to by both Laa and Phuumii, and,
once again, Phuumii’s response includes a sentence final epistemic particle, naa1,
which, as Enfield (2007:43) puts it, marks information that a speaker does not know,
but maybe should know. Here Phuumii again uses his SPP as a segue to further
dosing, where, in line 12, he untruthfully tells Taa that if he misses his shot he will
lose six points—a last minute attempt to get into Taa’s ears when, in reality, the game
is almost already in Taa’s hands.
Throughout this bit of interaction, Phuumii’s SPP-poaching sets up a series of
antagonistic doses, which Taa continues to ignore. That is, he ignores these doses
until just after this transcript ends, when he thereupon takes and makes his shot, and
—no longer at risk of losing his focus—says: “fooj3,” a verb meaning to “talk emptily”
and in this context, basically, “You’re bullshitting.” Much dosing is framed like this:
bullshitting; a series of nagging questions and responses to be ignored; contact for
distraction, for greed, for another’s money.
Phuumii was, by all accounts, not successful. Even with his FPPs and SPPs,
during this stretch of interaction, he failed to affect Taa in any obvious way, and
eventually lost the game. But even as he failed, his methods—his communicative
grappling hooks, as it were—exhibit some of the means dosers use to establish
contact for purposes other than building good will or forming positive social
relations.
When two people are good friends or family in Laos, the often-violated ideological
assumption is that they never gamble for money together. Normatively, if one
gambles at all, one should gamble only with vague associates. Talk during money
games, when people are brave enough to “open their mouths,” is thus imagined to be
either hyper-polite (as it was described in Vientiane) or “noisy” (nan2) and
aggressive. This is the opposite of how talk during “friendly” games is imagined.
In such games, especially those where people are playing for beer, distraction is
prevalent. But this distraction is said to produce different social effects. Many claim
that it is not really dosing as it is done for “fun” (muan1) rather than economic gain.
The distraction is described as “joking” (kaan3 jook5) and seems of a piece with other
practices where people poke and prod their friends, displaying their friendship
through pseudo-antagonism and mock violence. While Bii became seriously angry
with Can for screaming at him, during beer gambling games players at times do
much worse without reprimand. I have seen a player laugh, for example, as his doser
whacked him hard on his backside with a stick during a shot. The contact trope
behind such “joking” distraction is similar—as people say that one should try to
ignore those talking to you while you are attending to the game—but the presumed
social entailments of contact are different. The difference is economic interest. The
joke is a friendly violation, while the “dose” is a sign of greed and an act of unfair
play. The joke is talk “for fun,” where the dose is talk “for money.”24
What Contact Affords
In Luang Prabang, Laos, like everywhere else in the world, “contact” is not one-
dimensional, even when people talk about it as if it were. Contact (whether mediated
by a phone call, a WhatsApp message, or a visit to a baby shower or funeral) is at
times taken as, in and of itself, a sign of “love” and “solidarity,” positive sociality and
intimacy. At other times, like those discussed above, contact is shorthand for
distraction. But neither the former, more positive contact tropes nor the latter trope
embedded in discussions of dosing are pre-semiotic. Instead, contact affords a variety
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of pragmatic effects (Keane 2014:11). Nevertheless, contact does seem an especially
productive affordance for people to think through sociality and the meaning of social
relationships. This is perhaps because, at its most basic, contact is sociality. Relations
between communicative elements are relations, even if the content of such relations is
stripped down, ripe for elaboration, as simple as “this is addressed” or “this has been
seen.”
Simmel (1949:255) wrote, before Malinowski, that “association” with others, in its
broadest sense, can, on the one hand, be a “burden, endured for the sake of our
objective aims.” But it can also, on the other hand, produce its own satisfaction, as
“the solitariness of the individual is resolved into togetherness, a union with others.”
As I trace above, Malinowski’s notion of “phatic communion” emphasized the latter
phenomenon, where people revel in contact, co-presence, and the sounds of one
another’s voices. But as the epigraph to this article shows, Malinowski was also
clearly aware that contact can be too much, a burden, a distraction. In the title of this
article, I have called dosing “phatic violence” not to coin a new cross-cultural contact
trope, nor because dosing (unlike, say, some of the more troubling street harassment
mentioned above) is especially violent. While in other contexts, sound can inflict pain
(Goodman 2012) or even lead to “soul-loss” (Wikan 1989), I never heard petanque
gamblers explicitly say that dosing, as opposed to say shock or surprise generally (cf.,
Suwanlert 1988), had these sorts of long-term psychophysical consequences. Instead,
I have called dosing phatic violence to mark, as plainly as possible, what
communicative contact is not: an always-friendly affair.
Sapir (1921:13) wrote that while language is a “dynamo” capable of powering an
elevator, it is almost always operated to feed an electric doorbell. Some decades later
—as part of a brief discussion of “phatic” and other “conventional” forms–Uriel
Weinreich (1963:118) commented that linguists’ most pressing task is to explore the
elevator, not the doorbell. And yet, “phaticity,” the doorbell of language, and of
semiotic life more generally, is often a site of preoccupation and elaboration for
people themselves, as it is in dosing. It is thus worthy of attention. What might
it mean to summon a person to the door, to refuse to answer, or to play ding-dong-
ditch?
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1. For transcription of the Lao, I follow the system outlined in Enfield (2007). The numbers
following syllables represent tonal contours in the Vientiane dialect. I have omitted these tone
markers from the term saj1 jaa3 to ease reading.
2. Malinowski adopted the word phatic, as Senft (1995:227) tells us, from the Greek, phatos
(Φasος), meaning “spoken/may be spoken” (Williams 2005:154). Phatic communion, then,
meant “communion achieved through speech” (Laver 1975).
3. An anonymous reviewer notes that “communion” can have a more neutral sense. While
this is true, Malinowski was clearly stressing (and has been interpreted as stressing) the
broadly “positive” social effects of communication (cf. Senft 1995:227).
4. Thanks to Michael Silverstein for first pointing me toward this quotation.
5. Dell Hymes (1968:121), for example, recognized this disjuncture and suggested dividing
the phatic function into two subtypes.
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6. But, while we might sympathize with the cause of this battle, studies of communion
phaticity tend to imply a stark dichotomy between the referential and affiliative dimensions of
language. (There are, of course, many exceptions: for example, Coupland, Coupland, and
Robinson’s subtle study of “How are you?” (1992).) These dimensions of language are not
always so neatly separated, but often conjoined in the same time, space, and linguistic forms
(Rampton 2014:3). Furthermore, because “phatic talk” is from this perspective by definition
uninformative talk, these scholars have tended to identify it in the negative, i.e., as forms not
demonstrably aimed at communicating “information” and thus, by implication, aimed at
producing “social ties.” This has sometimes turned the phatic into a residual category of
communication without clear function, where if a form doesn’t mean anything referentially
explicit, or is redundant, or is unimportant, it is liable to be defined as “just phatic.” Rampton
(2014:3–4) points out the hyperbole of claims that “phatic talk” is meaningless; if someone
remarks, for instance, that President Kennedy’s inaugural speech carried “little information,”
“we’d have to believe that the President simply hummed or scatted through the inauguration.”
(Rampton was referring to a claim made in Leech (1981)).
7. In retrospect, it was probably not the best term to use—perhaps the “engineer” or
“operator” function would have been better—but see Jakobson (1971:557) for his negative view
of neologisms.
8. Clark follows Austin (1975). See Enfield (2013:91) for elaboration. Confusingly, Austin
also uses the term “phatic” in yet another sense, unrelated to Malinowski’s.
9. One of contact phaticity’s more interesting perforations concerns the distinction between
moments where contact is presupposed and taken for granted and those moments where
contact is an object of explicit metapragmatic engagement, or reference. Think of the difference
between a singer’s cooing and a microphone check. Whereas the former presupposes that the
microphone and amplificatory system are working, the latter’s purpose is to test these devices,
foregrounding their possible failure.
10. The status of channel as a count noun also invites people to count channels in
interaction, an exercise that can lead to endless line drawing and ad hoc distinctions.
11. Although Jakobson’s model is a model of the “speech event,” for a number of reasons,
any adequate theory of contact phaticity must not limit itself to the spoken. Here, I follow
Kockelman (2010:407) in repurposing the model and turning it into a model of “semiotic events
of any kind.” Limiting ourselves only to spoken language precludes us from taking the
materiality of new technologies seriously, and from wondering, for example and following
Nozawa (2013), “What, really, is at stake when those ‘three dots’ flicker ‘while the person on
the other end of your text message is writing a response.’”
12. Of course, so are tunnels. I do not aim to further reify a distinction between the material
and the semiotic here, merely to disabuse the notion that channels are found objects.
13. I recorded these games using a pair of mounted digital video cameras (one on each side
of the gravel court) and a central Zoom H4N microphone. They form part of a large corpus of
both beer and money-gambling games collected during fifteen months of fieldwork in Luang
Prabang from 2013–2016.
14. CompareGardner’s (1980:336) discussion of the harassment ofwomen onAmerican streets.
When harassers were confronted by harrassees, they too claimed they were “only kidding.”
15. After repeated listening, it is clear that Can ended his scream with vaw4 ~nang3 or “What
did [you] say?,” perhaps in reference to the offensive nickname (omitted here to guard Can’s
identity) that Bii repeatedly called Can. Later, Bii asked Can if he would prefer if he called him
“duck shit” instead of the nickname he was using. I have altered the image—a screen grab
from one of my video-recordings—to preserve anonymity.
16. tuun1 thêê4 hoong4 bak2 hêêng2 (h) (h) hêêng2 qiø-tuun1 leej2
17. qee3 qan3 nii4 l̂eq1 qan3 nii4 nii4 tang4 saj1 jaa3 thêê5 thêê5 dêê1 qan3 nii4 naq1.
18. qan3 nii4 man2 cong3 caj3 thii1 siø-vaw4 saj1 jaa3 phuu4 nii4 thêê5 thêê5
19. mung1 jaak5 vaw4 laø-vaw4 mot2 muu4 leej2 naa1. The fact that Bii made the shot
obviously made this a more powerful index of his invulnerability to Can’s talk.
20. For further discussion of these local categories of emotional state in a similar context, see
Cassaniti (2015).
21. While no one explicitly said that Phuumii was dosing during this or the next segment of
talk, Phuumii was accused of dosing—generally—multiple times during the game. On the
whole, these examples are relatively uncontroversial, recognizable, and idiomatic “doses”
(especially Phuumii’s “bravery gambit” and his offers to bet, discussed below), even if Phuumii
might have denied that they were anything but “talk.”
22. juu1 laa5 laa5 sook4 khwaam2 kotdan3 saj1 too3 qeng3
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23. Some obvious evidence of addressivity is that Taa uses a second person pronoun, “too3,”
which would be unusually informal for him to use in relation to Phuumii, whom he addresses
with caw4 (a more polite second person pronoun) or qaaj4 Phuumii (i.e., “older-brother
Phuumii”) throughout other moments of the interaction (Enfield and Stivers 2007).
24. Although I do not have space to walk through examples of this in this article, the line
between “talk” and a “dose” is, of course, negotiated, debatable and underdetermined. So too for
the lines between “jokes” and serious affronts, friends and enemies.
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